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Mergers in Innovation Copetition

A contest framework with knowledge spillovers, Management, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse 4

Erschienen am 28.04.2005, 1. Auflage 2005
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Bibliografische Daten
ISBN/EAN: 9783824481705
Sprache: Englisch
Umfang: xiv, 295 S., 9 s/w Illustr., 295 p. 9 illus.
Format (T/L/B): 1.6 x 21 x 14.8 cm
Einband: kartoniertes Buch

Beschreibung

InhaltsangabeKnowledge spillovers and horizontal mergers Innovation and industry structure Merger in oligopolistic contests

Produktsicherheitsverordnung

Hersteller:
Springer Gabler in Springer Science + Business Media
juergen.hartmann@springer.com
Tiergartenstr. 15-17
DE 69121 Heidelberg

Autorenportrait

InhaltsangabeContent.- 1 Introduction.- 1.1 Background.- 1.2 Plan of Study.- I Knowledge Spillovers and Horizontal Mergers.- 2 Knowledge, Innovation and Spillovers.- 2.1 Economic Properties of Knowledge.- 2.1.1 Some Conceptional Distinctions of Knowledge.- 2.1.2 Market Failure Characteristics.- 2.1.3 Summary of Economic Properties of Knowledge.- 2.2 Innovation Activities.- 2.2.1 Concepts and Definitions.- 2.2.2 Incentives to Innovate.- 2.2.3 Intellectual Property Rights.- 2.3 Knowledge Spillovers.- 2.4 Supplement: Absorptive Capacity.- 3 Horizontal Mergers.- 3.1 Concepts and Definitions.- 3.1.1 Mergers vs. Acquisitions.- 3.1.2 Horizontal, Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers.- 3.1.3 Hostile Takeovers.- 3.2 Motives for (Horizontal) Merger.- 3.2.1 Value Creation.- 3.2.2 Production Cost Reduction.- 3.2.3 Transaction Cost Reduction.- 3.2.4 Redistribution of Rents.- 3.2.5 Concluding Remarks.- II Innovation and Industry Structure.- 4 Previous Research.- 4.1 Concentration and Innovation.- 4.2 R&D Cooperation and Spillovers.- 4.3 Competition on Product Innovation.- 4.3.1 The Loury (1979) and Lee/Wilde (1980) Model.- 4.3.2 Structure of (R&D) Contest Models.- 5 Contests with Spillovers.- 5.1 Model specification.- 5.2 Two Firms.- 5.2.1 Properties of the Probability Function.- 5.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis.- 5.2.3 Cooperation Between Duopolists.- 5.2.4 Monopoly.- 5.3 n Firms.- 5.3.1 Technological Risk.- 5.3.2 Certain Innovation Success.- 5.4 Discussion of the Model.- III Merger in Oligopolistic Contests.- 6 Mergers in Contest Models.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 Merger Profitability.- 6.2.1 Profitability without Spillovers.- 6.2.2 Profitability with Spillovers.- 7 Post-Merger Organization of R&D.- 7.1 Fusion of R&D Departments.- 7.1.1 R&D Expenditures in Equilibrium.- 7.1.2 Profits in Equilibrium.- 7.2 R&D Units as Profit Centers.- 7.2.1 R&D Expenditures in Equilibrium.- 7.2.2 Profits in Equilibrium.- 7.2.3 Supplement: Incomplete Spillovers.- 7.3 R&D Units as Cost Centers.- 7.3.1 Knowledge Sharing.- 7.3.2 Knowledge Keeping.- 7.4 Merger with Centralized Budget Responsibility.- 7.4.1 R&D Expenditures in Equilibrium.- 7.4.2 Profits in Equilibrium.- 7.5 Summary.- 8 Mergers in Contests with Synergies.- 8.1 The Model Setting.- 8.2 A Numeric Example.- 8.3 Three Firm Industry without Technological Risk.- 8.3.1 Equilibrium Efforts.- 8.3.2 Equilibrium Profits.- 8.4 Three Firm Industry with Spillovers.- 8.4.1 Equilibrium Efforts.- 8.4.2 Equilibrium Profits.- 9 Conclusions and Remarks.- 9.1 Summary.- 9.2 Discussion.- 9.3 Implications.- 9.4 Limitations.- C Autonomous Budget Responsibility.- C.1 Total R&D Expenditures.- C.2 Profit Comparison.- D Centralized Budget Responsibility.- D.l Equilibrium R&D Expenditures.- D.2 Expenditure Comparison.- D.3 Profit Comparison.

Inhalt

Knowledge spillovers and horizontal mergers Innovation and industry structure Merger in oligopolistic contests